TOPIC ONE: EQUITABLE INTERESTS ARISING BY LAW

1. TRUSTS

A) RESULTING TRUSTS (UNEQUAL CONTRIBUTIONS)

CALVERLEY v GREEN (1984)
FACTS: long-term de facto relationship. C provided 2/3 of the purchase money for a property, and G provided 1/3. they were joint tenants at law since C's contribution was a mortgage he entered into together with G. the amounts contributed are calculated at time of purchase, so mortgage repayments not relevant. what were their interests?
HELD: GIBBS, MASON, BRENNAN, DEAN JJ - in equity, where there are mulitple contributions, the property interests are divided in proportion to each party's contribution. where there is an unequal contribution, the presumption of resulting trust will apply. here, at law they were JTs, but in equity holding in 1/3 and 2/3 respectively.

BROWN v BROWN (1993)
FACTS: looked at the presumption of advancement. a mother provided about half the purchase price for a house, he sons paid the rest by getting a loan. before she died, she willed her share to her daughters. the sons constested this, saying the contribution was a gift.
HELD: GELEESON J - there was no intention to gift the property. there was a resulting trust where the sons had legal title but held the mother's (not daugher's interest) on trust, in proportion to her contribution (about half the purchase price).

B) CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS (CONSTRUED BY LAW)

i) COMMON INTENTION CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST (arises at time of common intention)

OGILVIE v RYAN [1976]
FACTS: O was an old guy who owned property. he said that R moved in with him and took care of him, she could live in the house as long as she lived - conferring a life estate. he later died and his son tried to take possession of the land free of R's interest. she argued a CICT or oral agreement with part-performance. she failed on the second argument since the acts she performed were equivocal, not clearly in relation to the agreement (REGENT).
HELD: there was a CICT. there was a common intention that she would live there for her life if she took care of him, which she did. she had suffered detriment in the way of her significant contributions in taking care of him etc. hence, O's son held her interest on trust.

ii) REMEDIAL CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST

MUSCHINSKI v DODDS (1985)
FACTS: were a de facto couple from 72 - 80. M had paid the full purchase price of a property from selling a home she owned. they were TICs at law, even though by the end their contributions were split about 90/10. when they split up, M wanted everything and D wanted 50/50.
HELD: MASON, DEANE JJ – equity can intervene to ensure parties are repaid their capital investments. TIC confers distinct shares, in this case 90/10. if the sale of land creates a surplus to their capital investments, then the balance will be distributed evenly.

BAUMGARTNER v BAUMGARTNER (1987) (uncertain as to when it arises)
FACTS - there was a pooling of resources during cohabitation at a 55/45 split between the husband and wife.
HELD: MASON, DEANE, WILSON JJ – “pooled resources” for the purpose of the joint relationship and for the mutual security and benefit, hence they hold in shares proportionate to their contribution: 55/45.

PARIJ v PARIJ (1997)
FACTS: 17 year de facto relationship. P took care of the kids and home while the husband worked and accumulated assets (cars, property)
HELD: DEBELLE J – reasonable to infer that the male partner was able to work long hours and make money because he knew the P was at home taking care of the kids and home. COX J – non-financial contributions need to be taken into consideration.

2. ESTOPPEL

PLIMMER v MAYOR OF WELLINGTON (1884)
FACTS: NZ govt. got P to build a wharf, and encouraged him to do so in reliance he had a proprietary interest
HELD: there was an irrevocable licence was an “estate or interest” in the land which created an entitlement upon the vesting of the land to the NZ council

INWARDS v BAKER [1965]
FACTS: son built a house on his father’s property after dad encouraged him to do so. his father died and left property to someone else.
HELD: person expending the money is entitled to relief in equity, the “court will not allow the expectation to be defeated where it would be unequitable to do so.”

CRABB v ARUN DIST. (1975)
FACTS: C sub-divided his land so he could sell it, and gates A and B were the only entry point. council fenced off along C’s property, leaving gates A and B open. after the subdivision, the council then removed gate and wanted to sell easement to C
HELD: DENNING MR – “he leads another to believe he will not insist of his strict legal rights, the in turn does,” will result in equity in favour of the other. emedy: declaration that there was right of way at gate B for C

WALTON STORES v MAHER (1988)
FACTS: WS changed their plans and decided not to proceed with the lease, despite knowing that Maher had already started demolition work.
HELD: MASON CJ – the D must cause the P to assume she can rely on the promise or representation of intention. P must act to their DETRIMENT, and it must be unconscionable for the other to deny. remedy: damages in lieu of specific performance.

GUIMELLI v GUIMELLI (1999)
FACTS: dad told son to build house on his land and he would give that part of the land plus the house to him. the son married some slag and moved out, and then wanted ownership of the house he had built. the father refused.
HELD: GLEESON CJ – monetary relief for the value of property. need to look at third parties (such as siblings) and se eif it would be unfair to order specific performance.

NOTE: Expectation v Reliance – Crabb and Inward v Guimelli and Maher

RELEVANCE (topic one)

R v BUCHANAN
Facts: A was convicted with manslaughter, killing someone while driving. At the trial, a witness gave evidence that A had been drinking all day and that 30 mins before the incident, the A had been driving negligently. Was this relevant?
Held: of high relevance, as the consumption of alcohol so close to the incident made it more likely that the A did in fact commit the crime.

R v HORATH
Facts: A charged with culpable driving causing death. Witness saw the guy overtaking around bends and speeding 45 mins earlier and 50 kms away. Was this evidence relevant?
Held: no, for it to be relevant, there must’ve been a connecting link between what the witness saw and the state of the A at the time of the incident (re: Buchanan’s case, where alcohol linked the prior behaviour to the incident)

R v STEPHENSON
Facts: a fiat with four people in it make a turn at an intersection, where the A drove through and collided with the fiat, killing three of the occupants. It was never determined who was driving. D wanted to ask a medical witness if any of the people in the car had alcohol in their blood at time of accident. A was convicted and appealed.
Held: even if alcohol was present in the blood of the guys, it was never determined who was driving and therefore any medical evidence would be irrelevant.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

WILSON v R
Facts: A was charged with the murder of his wife, who died from a gunshot blast to the head. A argued that the shotgun had discharged accidentally – maybe the dog stood on the trigger. P lead evidence that showed that the two had two arguments, where the deceased said “I know you want to kill me for my money”, which was evidence as to motive. Was this evidence relevant?
Held: Barwick CJ noted that transient quarrels should not be admitted since it does not support motive. However, consistent quarrels such as in the current case may go to motive.

HEARSAY EVIDENCE

SUBRAMANIAM v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [1956] 1 WLR 965
facts: s was found in possession of ammunition, contrary to relevant legislation operating at the time. s argued that he had been captured by terrorists and was forced to hold onto the ammo in fear of being killed, raising the defence of duress. at the trial of first instance, it was held that his evidence (that he was captured etc.) was hearsay and s was convicted. he appealled.
held: the statement made by s re: being captured was not hearsay evidence for the following reasons:
a) the statement did not relate to the truth of the assertion, but rather simply that the assertion was made;
b)it did not matter if it was true that the terrorists were going to kill him, it was important however in showing that the statement made to s was enough to induce a belief that he was going to be killed, raising the defence of duress.

MYERS v DPP [1965] AC 1001
facts: A was charged with a conspiracy that involved selling stolen cars. in the old days, cars were sold with log books, and each subsequent sale would be recorded in the log book. the log book also had info regarding the car's chassis number, engine number, and block number; hence, the log book coudl establish ownership of the car. A bought wrecked cars WITH log books, then went out and stole cars of the same make and model and then sold them to innocent purchasers.
at the trial, the man responsible for recording engine/chassis/block numbers gave evidence that while the engine and chassis number corresponded with each other, the block number was different. he provided evidence in the way of photogrpahs of the records taken down when the cars were being assembled.
held: it was hearsay evidence for the following reason/s:
a) its probative value would only be relevent if the jury (or judge) took the contents of the photographs to be true.
hence: if the document is being used to establish the truth of the assertion made in the document, then it is classified as hearsay (documentary hearsay).
main point: since hearsay evidence is nearly always an issue in cases, if, from a logical analysis, the evidence is hearsay, then it is inadmissible. reasons for this approach are that:
a) when looking at hearsay, there must be clarity
b) there must be logical reasoning
c) very limited exceptions

RATTEN v THE QUEEN [1972] AC 378
facts: A was charged with the murder of his wife via shotgun to the head. he argued that the gun had discharged accidentally while he was cleaning it. the couple lived in a rural area and telephone calls made went through a telephonist. A said that no phone calls were made at the time of the shooting (between 1:12 and 1:20). a telephonist however, confirmed that there had been an outgoing call from the house at the relevant time, but also stated that the woman (the deceased) sounded frantic and asked to "get the police please." was this hearsay evidence?
held: a request (ie. to call the police) does not tend to prove anything at all. while it may allow implications to be drawn, the statement itself does not seek to convey any specific information.

WALTON v R (1989) 84 ALR 59; 63 ALJR 226
facts: A was accused of murdering his wife. P's case was that A arranged for his wife to meet him in the town square where he later took her to another place and killed her. it was established that the wife had in fact gone to the town square, but it had to be proven that she went pursuant to her husband's arrangement.
at the trial, witnesses gave evidence that the wife had told them she was going to meet her husband. furthermore, evidence was given that the wife was having a phone conversation and when her daughter asked who it was, she replied "daddy". the daughter then took the phone and referred to the guy on the other end as "daddy" also. were either of these pieces of evidence hearsay?
held: an intention to do something (ie. meet her husband) is classified as original evidence, and not hearsay and is therefore admissible. however, the phone conversation is clearly hearsay - how can one be sure that it was the accused on the phone? it could have been anyone that the wife and daughter were calling "daddy". it only has relevence if the guy was in fact the accused.

R v BENZ (1989) 168 CLR 110
facts: a mother and daughter were charged with the murder of the mother's de facto partner. his body was found down-stream of a river and there was a footbridge near by. P's case was that the two had killed the guy then dumped his body over the bridge. a witness gave evidence that he saw two women on the bridge at the relevent time, and went over to ask if they were ok. the younger woman replied "my mother is feeling sick." was this hearsay?
held: the evidence of the witness proves that there was a mother and daughter on the bridge at the relevent time, but it does not prove that it was the accused. furthermore, the evidence would only be relevent if the statements made to the witness were in fact taken to be true (that they were mother and daughter). hence, hearsay evidence.